



OPEN ACCESS

Plural Subject Theory and the Common Good: A Human Rights Critique in Dialogue with Islamic Political Thought

Sidra Tariq^{1*}

¹Department of Philosophy, University of the Punjab, Lahore, Pakistan

Received : 13 February 2026

Revised : 15 April 2026

Accepted : 1 May 2026

Online : 01 June 2026


Abstract

This paper critically examines Margaret Gilbert's plural subject theory through the objective of human rights and the concept of the common good. Gilbert's plural subject theory offers a thrilling account of collective agency grounded in joint commitment, explaining how individuals form unified agents capable of coordinated action and shared responsibility. However, despite its analytical strength, the theory remains normatively limited in addressing the moral status of non-members and the principle of universal human equality. This study adopts a conceptual and normative philosophical methodology to develop a human rights-based critique of plural subject theory. It argues that while joint commitments smooth social cohesion and collective identity. They may also create exclusionary and oppressive outcomes when not in line with universal ethical principles. To address these limitations, the paper incorporates insights from Islamic political philosophy, particularly the concepts of *maslahah* (public welfare), *adl* (justice), *shura* (consultation), and *ummah* (community), to construct a more comprehensive and ethically grounded conception of the common good. By joining the plural subject theory with human rights and cross-civilizational ethical contexts, the study proposes a revised normative model of collective agency in which human rights are understood as collectively recognised moral obligations. This model provides a more comprehensive account of collective action united with universal human dignity and offers a stronger foundation for evaluating political, social, and institutional arrangements.

Keywords: Common Good, Collective Agency, Human Rights, Islamic Political Philosophy, Plural Subject Theory,

*Corresponding Authors

Sidra Tariq– University of the Punjab, Lahore, Pakistan

 <https://orcid.org/0009-0001-5182-1832>

Email: sidratariq741@gmail.com



Copyright:

© 2026 by the author(s).

This article is an open-access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.

(<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/>).



INTRODUCTION

Human beings are fundamentally social. Their existence is deeply fixed in links of relationships, shared purposes, and collective practices. Social life is not simply a collection of individual actions but a structured system of coordinated behavior grounded in shared meanings and mutual recognition. Philosophically, this phenomenon is explored through the concept of collective agency, which examines how individuals come to act together as a unified 'we' rather than as lonely agents (Bratman, 2014). Across civilizations, the question of how groups form, what obligations they generate, and how they ought to act has been a central moral concern. In Islamic political philosophy, the concept of *maslahah* the promotion of public welfare and the inhibition of harm have long provided a normative basis for evaluating the legitimacy of collective action (Kamali, 2008). The question of collective moral responsibility is therefore not unique to Western social ontology. It is similarly central to Islamic ethical and political thought.

Among the most significant contributions to the philosophy of collective agency is Margaret Gilbert's plural subject theory. According to (Gilbert, 2006), individuals form a plural subject when they jointly commit to acting as a body toward a shared goal. This joint commitment generates mutual obligations that fix participants together and create a unified agent capable of coordinated action. The theory provides a powerful explanation of social cohesion, collective responsibility, and the normative structure of group behavior. It has been commonly recognized for rejecting individualistic and aggregative accounts of group agency (Gilbert, 1996, p. 58).

Despite its strengths, Gilbert's background leaves a critical normative issue insufficiently addressed. While it explains how obligations arise within groups. It does not adequately account for the moral standing of individuals who are not party to these commitments. In real-world contexts, collective actions commonly affect non-members, raising serious ethical concerns regarding exclusion, disregarding, and injustice. This limitation becomes particularly apparent in political, legal, and established contexts. Groups may pursue objectives that benefit their members while concurrently harming outsiders without violating their internal commitments. Corporations may prioritize profit maximization at the expense of workers' rights, or political groups may advance policies that disadvantage minority populations (Donnelly, 2013; Reicher & Haslam, 2006). These cases illustrate a fundamental tension between group-based obligations and universal moral principles.

Human rights theory offers a contrasting perspective by emphasizing the inherent dignity and equality of all individuals, regardless of group membership (Beitz, 2009; Donnelly, 2013). It requires that collective actions be evaluated not only in terms of internal coherence but also in relation to universal ethical standards. The central research question guiding this study is: How can plural subject theory be revised to incorporate universal human rights and provide a more inclusive account of the common good? This paper argues that plural subject theory must be supplemented by human rights principles and insights from Islamic political philosophy particularly *maslahah* (public welfare), *adl* (justice), *shura* (consultation), and *ummah* (moral community) to develop a more comprehensive and inclusive normative model of collective agency.

The significance of this study lies in its cross-civilizational approach. By integrating Western social ontology with Islamic ethical thought, it contributes to a more global and inclusive understanding of collective agency and the common good. The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 reviews the relevant literature; Section 3 presents the methodology; Section

4 presents findings and discussion across four thematic areas; and Section 5 offers conclusions and suggestions for further research.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The concept of collective agency has been extensively developed within contemporary philosophy. Gilbert's plural subject theory emphasizes joint commitment as the foundation of collective action. It is argued that individuals form a unified subject when they mutually recognize each other and accept shared obligations (Gilbert, 1989, 2006). This method highlights the normative dimension of collective agency, unique it from purely individualistic accounts. Gilbert's central insight is that a plural subject is constituted not by the coincidental alignment of individual interests but by the joint acknowledgement of a shared obligation to pursue a common goal as a body. Once formed, this joint commitment generates internal normative obligations. Members are mutually bound and may not separately withdraw without committing a moral breach.

Michael Bratman (2014) offers a complementary perspective through his planning theory of shared agency. For Bratman, shared agency develops when individuals align their intentions and coordinate their actions through interconnected planning structures. Unlike Gilbert, Bratman grounds collective agency in the coordination of individual intentions rather than in a sui generis joint commitment. (Searle, 1995) explains collective intentionality in terms of shared mental states 'we-intentions' which he regards as irreducible to individual intentions. (Tuomela, 2007) further develops these ideas by distinguishing between individualistic and collective perspectives within group action, arguing that collective agency involves a shared point of view that cannot be reduced to individual intentions.

While these theories provide valuable insights into the internal dynamics of collective agency, they share a common limitation: they focus on the internal structure of group formation and largely neglect broader normative concerns about the moral responsibility of collective agents toward non-members. Human rights theorists such as (Beitz, 2009 Donnelly, 2013) challenge this group-centered focus by insisting that moral and political systems must be grounded in universal principles of human dignity and equality. From this perspective. The common good cannot be defined just by the interests and commitments of particular groups; it must encompass the welfare and dignity of all persons.

Current scholarship has sought to bridge the gap between collective agency and human rights. (Gould, 2019) argues that human rights can be understood as socially grounded and collectively continued, so linking individual rights with collective responsibility. This perspective provides an important foundation for join in plural subject theory with human rights, signifying that rights are not merely individual entitlements. Normative commitments that political communities as plural subjects are obligated to defend. (List & Pettit, 2011) similarly argue that group agents can be genuine bearers of moral responsibility, capable of rights and duties analogous to those of individuals.

Contempt these contributions, a significant gap remains: the existing literature has not systematically involved with Islamic political philosophy as a resource for educational accounts

of collective moral agency. Islamic thought offers a complete conception of the common good through the concept of *maslahah*, which emphasizes public welfare and the prevention of harm (Auda, 2008; Kamali, 2008). The framework of *maqasid al-shari'ah* identifies key normative objectives the protection of religion, life, intellect, extraction, and wealth which function as universal ethical standards applicable to all persons regardless of group membership. The concept of *ummah* (moral community) further emphasizes collective moral responsibility. Though *shura* (consultation) and *adl* (justice) provide procedural and substantive normative constraints on collective agency (An-Na'im, 2008). These concepts get ahead many of the normative requirements that human rights theory identifies. And their addition into social ontology offers both a cross-civilizational validation and enrichment of the revised model developed in this paper.

The existing literature determines the analytical power of plural subject theory in explaining collective agency but also reveals. Its normative limitations regarding non-members and universal moral obligations. Human rights theory and Islamic political philosophy together provide the normative resources necessary to develop a more complete and inclusive account. This study addresses the identified gap by developing a cross-cultural normative model of collective agency that integrates these three frameworks.

METHODS

This study adopts a theoretical and normative philosophical methodology. Rather than trusting on empirical data, it engages in critical analysis and theoretical synthesis of existing philosophical contexts. This approach is standard in analytic philosophy and social ontology, where the aim is to assess the internal consistency, normative adequacy, and conceptual scope of theoretical contexts (Chalmers & Jackson, 2001). The research does not involve human participants, research, or empirical data collection; its findings are produced through systematic philosophical reasoning.

The methodology proceeds through four stages. In the first stage, a conceptual analysis of Gilbert's plural subject theory is conducted through close reading of her primary texts (Gilbert, 1989, 2006, 2013), focusing on the nature of joint commitment and collective obligation. In the second stage, the theory is evaluated from a human rights perspective, drawing on (Beitz, 2009; Donnelly 2013, & Nussbaum 2006), to identify its normative limitations with respect to non-members and universal moral equality. In the third stage, insights from Islamic political philosophy are introduced as a complementary normative framework, drawing principally on Kamali (2008), An-Na'im (2008), and Auda (2008) to examine how *maslahah*, *adl*, *shura*, and *maqasid al-shari'ah* bear on questions of collective moral agency and the common good. In the fourth and final stage, insights from all three frameworks are synthesized into a revised normative model of collective agency. This approach enables systematic evaluation not only of how plural subjects form but of whether and how they ought to act in relation to those outside the group.

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSIONS

Findings

This study found that the plural subject theory developed by Margaret Gilbert has significant analytical power in explaining how collective agents are formed through

mechanisms of joint commitment that result in normative obligations among their members. This theory successfully shows that collective action is not simply an aggregation of individual interests, but is formed from a shared recognition of morally binding commitments. However, the main findings of this study confirm that these forces are limited because they tend to be inward-looking and do not provide an adequate normative framework to assess the impact of collective actions on parties outside the group. As a result, this theory has the potential to legitimize exclusive and even oppressive practices when a group pursues its own interests without considering the rights and well-being of non-members. In addition, this study also found that the theory is less sensitive to the conditions of structural inequality and the possibility of coercion in the formation of mutual commitments, so there is a risk of maintaining unfair power relations.

Further, this study identifies a fundamental tension between the internal logic of the plural subject and the universal principle of human rights. In the plural subject framework, the "common good" is understood as a common goal agreed upon by the members of the group, but in the human rights perspective, the common good must encompass the whole of humanity regardless of group membership. These findings suggest that without the integration of human rights principles, the concept of the common good in Gilbert's theory tends to be partial and exclusive. In contrast, the human rights approach demands that any collective action be subject to universal principles such as human dignity, equality, and justice, thus extending the scope of moral responsibility from the group to the entire human race.

The study also found that Islamic political philosophy offers an important contribution to overcoming these limitations through normative concepts such as *maslahah* (the common good), *'adl* (justice), *shura* (deliberation), and *maqasid al-shari'ah*. The concept of *maslahah* asserts that collective goals should be oriented towards universal well-being and prevention of harm, while the *maqasid* framework provides universal ethical standards by emphasizing the protection of five fundamental aspects of human life. The *'adl* principle demands justice for all parties, including non-members, and *shura* ensures that the formation of collective commitments is carried out through an inclusive participatory process. These findings suggest a strong convergence between the principles in Islamic political philosophy and human rights values, so that they can serve as mutually reinforcing normative foundations.

Based on this synthesis, this study resulted in the formulation of a new normative model of collective agency consisting of three layers: the internal structure of the plural subject theory, the universal principle of human rights, and the ethical foundation of Islamic political philosophy. This model not only maintains the analytical power of Gilbert's theory, but also expands its normative scope by placing human rights as a collective obligation and making *maslahah* the main orientation in determining the common good. Thus, this study affirms that morally valid collective action must be based on universal recognition, shared responsibility, and commitment to justice and the well-being of all human beings, not just members of certain groups.

Discussion

Limitations of Plural Subject Theory

Gilbert's plural subject theory provides a convincing account of how collective obligations arise through joint commitment (Gilbert, 2006). When individuals jointly recognize and accept a shared obligation to act as a body toward a common goal. They constitute a plural subject bound by non-summative normative ties. This background effectively explains social cohesion. The deontic bonds behind groups, and the persistence of collective identity across

time and change. Its rejection of individualistic reductionism represents a significant advance in social ontology.

However, these obligations are primarily internal to the group and lack external moral constraints. The formation of plural subjects inherently creates a distinction between insiders and outsiders. While this distinction is necessary for group identity. It also raises serious ethical concerns. Groups may pursue goals that benefit members while harming non-members, without violating their internal commitments (Reicher & Haslam, 2006). A corporation jointly committed to profit maximization may systematically disregard workers' rights; a traditional or religious group may enforce unfair norms against those outside its boundaries. Gilbert's model, focused on the internal normative structure of the plural subject, lacks the conceptual device to critique such outcomes as failures of genuine collective agency.

Furthermore, the theory does not adequately address situations involving coercion or structural inequality. Individuals fixed in patriarchal, classified, or oppressive structures may appear to participate in joint commitments while lacking genuine freedom or equality to do so. (Gilbert, 2000) acknowledges that coercion does not dissolve a joint commitment but maintains its binding force nonetheless. This position dangers legitimizing normatively compromised commitments, potentially entrenching power imbalances and violating individual autonomy. The framework also lacks robust mechanisms for external accountability or the unilateral dissolution of commitments that have become harmful, leaving dissenters morally obligated within groups that perpetrate rights violations.

while Gilbert's ontology powerfully explains how plural subjects form, it inadequately addresses whether they should form in particular ways and how they ought to act toward outsiders. These normative gaps call for supplementation by frameworks that extend moral consideration beyond group boundaries.

Human Rights and the Common Good

Human rights theory offers a universal framework for evaluating collective action. It emphasizes the inherent dignity and equality of all individuals (Donnelly, 2013). From this perspective, the common good must extend beyond group interests to include the well-being of all persons, regardless of group membership. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) crystallizes this vision all human beings possess inherent dignity and equal rights that society as a whole is obligated to protect and promote.

This creates a critical tension with plural subject theory. Gilbert's social ontology frames the common good as the internal aim of the plural subject the shared goal jointly committed to by its members (Gilbert, 2006, p. 71). While analytically coherent, this framing is normatively parochial: it provides no inherent resources for ensuring that a group's pursuit of its common good aligns with the rights and welfare of those outside it. Human rights discourse, by contrast, demands that the common good be reconceptualized not merely as the internal aim of plural subjects but as a universal moral ideal placing normative constraints on all collective agency (MacIntyre, 1984; Nussbaum, 2006).

A defensible account of the common good must therefore reconcile these perspectives. When interpreted through Gilbert's plural subject framework, the societal endorsement of human rights norms can be understood as a collective joint commitment: members of a political community mutually recognize that they are bound to protect these rights not merely as an abstract preference but as an obligation arising from their shared will (Donnelly, 2013). This reframes the common good from an abstract aggregate of welfare to a concrete, jointly willed moral project that is binding on all members of the community.

As (Young, 2000) warns, however, political communities often fail to ensure equal participation in the formulation of joint obligations. When plural subject formation is constrained by structural inequity, the resulting 'common good' reflects the interests of dominant groups rather than a genuinely inclusive consensus. A normatively legitimate plural subject must be constituted through genuine mutual recognition by all parties, not through formalistic or top-down arrangements. Extending this requirement to incorporate human rights means that joint commitments are legitimately binding only when formed through participatory, transparent, and equitable processes (Habermas, 1996).

Islamic Conception of the Common Good

Islamic political philosophy provides a broader, holistic, and independently grounded understanding of the common good. The concept of *maslahah* the promotion of public welfare and the prevention of harm define the common good not as the internal aim of any particular community but as an objective moral standard applicable to all persons (Auda, 2008; Kamali, 2008). This concept is not merely a functional criterion of utility maximization; it is embedded in a comprehensive normative framework that recognizes the inherent dignity and moral worth of every human being.

The framework of *maqasid al-shari'ah* the higher objectives of Islamic law identify five essential goods that any legitimate collective agent must protect and promote: religion (*din*), life (*nafs*), intellect (*'aql*), lineage (*nasl*), and wealth (*mal*) (Kamali, 2008). These objectives function as universal normative constraints on collective action, ensuring that the common good pursued by any group extends beyond its own members. Crucially, they impose obligations toward all persons: a collective agent that pursues its internal goals at the expense of these fundamental goods for non-members violates the very purpose of legitimate collective action in the Islamic framework.

The concept of *ummah* the Muslim moral community provides a model of collective agency that parallels, yet significantly differs from, Gilbert's plural subject. The *ummah* is bound not merely by joint commitment to a shared goal but by shared moral values, divine obligations, and a collective responsibility to uphold justice (*adl*) for all persons, including non-members (An-Na'im, 2008). The Islamic principle of *ijma'* (scholarly consensus) similarly assigns binding normative force to collective agreements, echoing Gilbert's mutual recognition requirement, while *shura* (consultation) mandates that collective decisions arise from genuine participation and deliberation rather than from unilateral imposition or structural coercion.

These Islamic concepts do not merely parallel the requirements identified by human rights theory; they provide an independently grounded, cross-civilizational validation of the normative constraints this paper identifies as necessary supplements to Gilbert's framework. The convergence of *maslahah* and human rights on the universal scope of moral obligation, and of *shura* and deliberative democracy on the procedural requirements of legitimate collective agency, supports the cross-cultural normative model developed in the following section.

Revised Normative Model of Collective Agency

This paper recommends a reviewed normative model of collective agency that integrates plural subject theory with human rights and Islamic ethics. The model preserves the analytical strengths of Gilbert's account its explanation of how joint commitments generate binding normative obligations and constitute unified collective agents while extending its normative scope to encompass universal moral responsibilities toward all persons.

In this revised model, collective agency is guided by three layers of normative constraint. The first layer, drawn from Gilbert's framework, establishes the internal normative

structure of the plural subject: joint commitments generate mutual obligations that bind members and constitute the group as a unified agent capable of coordinated action and collective responsibility (Gilbert, 2006; List & Pettit, 2011). The second layer, drawn from human rights theory, extends these obligations outward: joint commitments are only fully legitimate when they incorporate negative duties prohibiting harm to non-members, allow for dissolution when commitments violate fundamental rights, and orient the group's common good toward universal human dignity (Beitz, 2009; Donnelly, 2013; Nussbaum, 2006). Human rights are thus reframed not as individual entitlements opposed to collective obligations but as collectively endorsed moral commitments that political communities as plural subjects are bound to uphold (Gould, 2019).

The third layer, drawn from Islamic political philosophy, provides a cross-civilizational grounding for these normative requirements. The *maqasid al-shari'ah* framework orients collective agency toward the protection of universal human goods that no group's joint commitment can legitimately override. The principle of *adl* demands that collective agents treat all persons fairly regardless of membership status, while *shura* requires that joint commitments be formed through genuine consultation and mutual recognition, consistent with both Gilbert's procedural requirements and (Habermas's, 1996) deliberative model. The concept of *maslahah* functions as a substantive normative benchmark, ensuring that the common good pursued by any plural subject remains tethered to the universal welfare of all persons rather than the narrow interests of group members (Kamali, 2008; Auda, 2008).

This model also serves as a critique of purely utilitarian definitions of the common good. Where utilitarianism maximizes aggregate satisfaction, the revised model demands mutual recognition, self-binding commitments, and the protection of fundamental rights even at the cost of short-term utility. This position is supported by both (Rawls's, 1999) public reason framework which requires free and equal citizens to deliberate on foundational principles of justice and by the Islamic requirement that collective decisions serve *maslahah* rather than narrow group interests. Together, these convergent traditions suggest that the common good is neither a top-down imposition nor a mere average of group preferences, but a morally binding project of universal mutual recognition and responsibility (Benhabib, 2004; Habermas, 1996).

Practically, this model has direct implications for the evaluation of political communities, corporations, and international institutions. A political community that has jointly committed to upholding human rights is, under this model, not merely acting out of pragmatic self-interest when pursuing those ends; it is fulfilling obligations that arise from its own self-constituted identity as a collective moral agent (List & Pettit, 2011, p. 45). Similarly, institutions that claim to represent the common good must be assessed not only in terms of their internal coherence but also in terms of their treatment of non-members, their procedural legitimacy, and their substantive commitment to universal human welfare.

CONCLUSION

This paper has established that Margaret Gilbert's plural subject theory, while analytically powerful in explaining the formation and normative force of joint commitments, is normatively incomplete when evaluated against the standards of human rights and a universal conception of the common good. Its primary limitation lies in its exclusive focus on intra-group obligations, which leaves the moral standing of non-members inadequately addressed and provides no inherent mechanism for preventing exclusionary or oppressive outcomes. This incompleteness becomes particularly apparent when Gilbert's framework is placed in dialogue with human

rights theory and Islamic political philosophy, both of which ground the moral responsibilities of collective agents in universal principles that transcend group boundaries.

The principal theoretical contribution of this paper is the development of a revised normative model of collective agency that integrates Gilbert's joint commitment theory, the universal human rights conception of the common good, and the Islamic normative framework of *maslahah*, *adl*, *shura*, and *maqasid al-shari'ah*. This model is explicitly cross-civilizational in character. It preserves the explanatory strengths of Gilbert's social ontology while extending its normative scope to encompass universal moral responsibilities toward all persons. In this model, human rights are reframed as collectively endorsed moral obligations a position that resonates with the Islamic understanding of collective duties as grounded in universal moral law rather than voluntary agreement alone. The paper thereby advances the argument that the common good is neither a top-down imposition nor a mere aggregate of group preferences, but a morally binding project of universal mutual recognition and responsibility.

Practically, this model offers a systematic normative framework for evaluating political communities, corporations, and international institutions. It demonstrates that collectively rational action requires ethical responsibility toward universal human rights and dignity, and that institutions claiming to represent the common good must be assessed not only in terms of internal coherence but also in terms of their treatment of non-members, procedural legitimacy, and substantive commitment to universal welfare. Theoretically, the model advances ongoing debates in social ontology and political philosophy by establishing that collective agency is rightly assessable against universal moral imperatives. It also contributes to the emerging field of cross-civilizational political philosophy by demonstrating the productive convergence between Western social ontology, international human rights doctrine, and Islamic political thought.

The primary limitation of this study is its conceptual and philosophical character; it does not include empirical analysis of specific institutions or movements. Future research could apply the revised normative model to concrete political contexts, examining how human rights-based joint commitments function within states, corporations, or global governance institutions. Particularly promising avenues include comparative studies of how Islamic governance institutions such as *shura* councils, *waqf* (charitable endowment) systems, or international Islamic organizations operationalize the principles of *maslahah* and *adl* in practice. Further inquiry might also explore the conditions under which inclusive processes of joint commitment formation can counteract domination and exclusion of vulnerable groups, drawing on both Western deliberative democracy theory and Islamic models of consultative governance.

CONFLICT OF INTEREST

The authors declare no conflict of interest

REFERENCES

- Al-Qaradawi, Y. (2001). *Fi fiqh al-awlawiyyat*. Maktabat Wahbah.
- An-Na'im, A. A. (2008). *Islam and the secular state: Negotiating the future of Shari'a*. Harvard University Press.
- Auda, J. (2008). *Maqasid al-Shariah as philosophy of Islamic law: A systems approach*. International Institute of Islamic Thought.
- Benhabib, S. (2004). *The rights of others: Aliens, residents, and citizens*. Cambridge University Press.

- Beitz, C. R. (2009). *The idea of human rights*. Oxford University Press.
- Bratman, M. (2014). *Shared agency: A planning theory of acting together*. Oxford University Press.
- Bratman, M. (2020). Shared intentionality. *Ethics*, 130(2), 241–269. <https://doi.org/10.1086/706140>
- Collins, R. (2004). *Interaction ritual chains*. Princeton University Press.
- Donnelly, J. (2013). *Universal human rights in theory and practice* (3rd ed.). Cornell University Press.
- Donnelly, J., & Whelan, D. J. (2020). *International human rights* (5th ed.). Routledge.
- Gilbert, M. (1989). *On social facts*. Princeton University Press.
- Gilbert, M. (2000). *Sociality and responsibility: New essays in plural subject theory*. Rowman & Littlefield.
- Gilbert, M. (2006). *A theory of political obligation: Membership, commitment, and the bonds of society*. Oxford University Press.
- Gilbert, M. (2013). *Joint commitment: How we make the social world*. Oxford University Press.
- Gould, C. C. (2019). *Globalizing democracy and human rights* (2nd ed.). Cambridge University Press.
- Habermas, J. (1996). *Between facts and norms: Contributions to a discourse theory of law and democracy*. MIT Press.
- Kamali, M. H. (2008). *Shari'ah law: An introduction*. Oneworld Publications.
- List, C. (2019). What is it like to be a group agent? *Noûs*, 53(2), 295–319. <https://doi.org/10.1111/nous.12227>
- List, C., & Pettit, P. (2011). *Group agency: The possibility, design, and status of corporate agents*. Oxford University Press.
- MacIntyre, A. (1984). *After virtue* (2nd ed.). University of Notre Dame Press.
- Nussbaum, M. C. (2006). *Frontiers of justice: Disability, nationality, species membership*. Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
- Rawls, J. (1999). *A theory of justice* (rev. ed.). Harvard University Press.
- Reicher, S., & Haslam, S. A. (2006). Rethinking the psychology of tyranny. *British Journal of Social Psychology*, 45(1), 1–40. <https://doi.org/10.1348/014466605X80714>
- Schmid, H. B. (2018). Plural action. *Philosophy Compass*, 13(1), e12488. <https://doi.org/10.1111/phc3.12488>
- Schmid, H. B. (2020). Collective intentionality and group rights. *Journal of Social Philosophy*, 51(2), 189–210. <https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.12327>
- Searle, J. R. (1995). *The construction of social reality*. Free Press.
- Tuomela, R. (2007). *The philosophy of sociality: The shared point of view*. Oxford University Press.
- Young, I. M. (2000). *Inclusion and democracy*. Oxford University Press.